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Democratic Theory and Policy Analysis:
Four Models of “Policy, Politics and Choice”
Abstract
This essay considers four ideal-type governance me-
chanisms from the perspective of democratic theory.
It argues that democratic theory may help to make
explicit the implicit value-choices embodied in these
governance mechanisms, and so provide the basis
for cross-value critical discourse. In addition, this
cross-value discourse may be used to identify the
appropriate normative, political and institutional
settings for each mechanism.
Key words: Models of Democracy, Governance,
Policy Tools, Normative Theory, Philosophy and
Public Affairs, Policy Paradigms
Zusammenfassung
Demokratietheorie und Staatstätigkeit: Vier Modelle
von „Policy, Politics and Choice“
Dieser Beitrag vergleicht vier Idealtypen politischer
Steuerungsmechanismen aus der Perspektive der
Demokratietheorie. Die demokratietheoretische Be-
trachtung erlaubt es, die impliziten Wertentschei-
dungen, die stets mit der Wahl eines der verschiede-
nen Steuerungsmechanismen verbunden sind, expli-
zit zu machen. Damit wird die Basis für einen werte-
übergreifenden kritischen Diskurs geschaffen. Die
kritische Betrachtung einzelner Steuerungsmecha-
nismen aus verschiedenen normativen Perspektiven
erlaubt es, die normativen, politischen und institu-
tionellen Bedingungen zu spezifizieren, unter denen
ein bestimmter Steuerungsmechanismus eine gleich-
sam effektive und legitime Lösung politischer Pro-
blemlagen bietet.
Schlagworte: Demokratiemodelle, Staatstätigkeit,
politische Steuerungsmechanismen, Demokratie-
theorie, Staatsaufgaben, Policy-Paradigmen
Most policy typologies focus on the characteristics of public policies. For example,
Theodore J. Lowi’s (1972) seminal contribution argues that the nature of a public policy
itself – whether it is distributive, regulatory or re-distributive – produces particular pat-
terns of political conflict. Similarly, James Q. Wilson (1980) analyses the distribution of
costs and benefits engendered by a policy (concentrated versus diffuse) in order to ex-
plain different patterns of regulatory conflict. Other scholars take as their starting point
policy tools or instruments, such as “carrots, sticks, and sermons” or the use of taxes, per-
suasion, public-private partnerships and the like (Hood 2006). B. Guy Peters (2005) sug-
gests a typology of policy problems – whether solvable, complex, divisible – and argues
that the choice of tool must fit the type of problem.
By contrast, the approach presented here places politics at the center of the analysis.
It is based on the concept of policy paradigms. A policy paradigm is an approach to pol-
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icy analysis that identifies a link between philosophical justifications, theories of govern-
ance, and specific policy tools. As the name ‘paradigm’ implies, these approaches act as
perceptual lenses, leading analysts to focus on particular criteria for policy analysis and to
disregard others. My claim is that the choice of a particular policy tool is actually the
choice of an entire policy paradigm, which includes normative reasoning and a theory of
governance. Thus this choice is highly political: it engenders a choice of political values,
and it has ramifications for the political influence of different groups and strata of citi-
zens. My intent in this essay is three-fold. First, I wish to lay out the political philosophy
that informs the four policy paradigms. Each paradigm is grounded in an ideal-type
model of democracy: neo-utilitarian, pluralist, etatist, or institutionalist. I argue that these
four normative models serve as the basis for four distinct theories of political governance
and provide arguments for the use of different ideal-type governance mechanisms: mar-
ket, association, state, and deliberation. Further, I argue that these political philosophies
inform not just the basic theories of governance, but the choice of specific policy instru-
ments. For example, the neo-utilitarian model of democracy (which will be described in
depth below) provides normative and practical justifications for both the use of markets
as a governance mechanism in general, and for voucher programs for public school
choice as a specific policy tool. Second, I use these competing models to develop a cross-
value critique of these competing governance models and their corresponding policy
tools. In this way, the potential blind spots of a particular paradigm are corrected by ap-
plying the perceptual lens of the competing paradigms. Third, I argue that one may use
this cross-value critique to establish criteria to determine the conditions under which a
particular policy tool is most appropriate. As my unit of analysis is the typology of mod-
els of democracy that informs both ideal-type governance models and specific policy
tools, I structure the remaining sections of the paper according to the four ideal-type
models of democracy that inform each policy paradigm.
Public Policy as Democratic Governance
The link between democratic theory and public policy begins with the conception of pub-
lic policy as embodying the principle of “democratic governance.” If the coercive power
of the state is to be brought to bear to implement public policies, then – in democracies –
these policies should rightly be made by a process of democratic governance or demo-
cratic political choice. Moreover, public policies are themselves based on introducing
governance mechanisms. Emissions trading, school vouchers, interest group negotiations
on labor conditions, and deliberations about bio-ethics are all policy solutions (alterna-
tively known as “policy tools” or “policy instruments”) that entail introducing a govern-
ance mechanism. Even “command-and-control“ policies entail the introduction of a gov-
ernance mechanism, as everyday implementation of the policy requires that decisions be
made on a wealth of specific issues that cannot be set out in legislation. As will be dis-
cussed, emissions trading and school choice are policy tools based on the neo-utilitarian
democratic theory of governance, i.e., markets as a mechanism of governance. Interest
group negotiations are the policy tool of choice of pluralist democracy; they entail the in-
troduction of governance by associations. Deliberations about bio-ethics are an example
of the institutionalist democratic ideal; here deliberation is the favored mechanism of
governance. And command-and-control regulation is an example of state governance,
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which is favored by etatist theories of democracy. By what criteria, then, should we as-
certain whether or not political decisions to enact public policies – as well as public pol-
icies employing micro-choice governance mechanisms – are worthy of the approbation,
“democratic choice”? And why do different scholars and political movements prefer one
democratic governance paradigm above the others?
Democratic theory provides four basic answers to this question. Normative models of
democratic choice can be classified according to the types of judgments they make about
both inputs and outputs to the democratic process, in other words, to their judgments and
standards for input and output legitimacy. “Inputs“ would be the demands and prefer-
ences of individuals and groups; “outputs“ the public policies produced. Political theories
vary with regard to whether they apply substantive or formal standards to evaluate these
inputs and outputs. A substantive standard is based on a transcendent value or norm, such
as justice or equality of result. In the case of environmental policy, the standard could be
environmental impact based on current scientific consensus. A formal theory, by contrast,
is based on a procedural or immanent standard. A formal standard might be whether all
individuals have a formal right to decide on a particular policy or whether rules of proce-
dural fairness are used to make political decisions. In contrast to substantive theories,
formal theories make no judgment about the result of the political process, but simply as-
sess the fairness of the process by which the decision was produced. Taking the distinc-
tion between inputs and outputs, as well as the distinction between formal and substantive
judgments, we are left with the following 2 x 2 table.
Table One: Four Normative Models of Democratic Choice
Outputs:Four Models of Democratic Choice
Formal
A posteriori
Substantive
A priori
Formal
De jure
I.  Neo-Utilitarian IV. InstitutionalistInputs:
Substantive
De facto
II. Pluralist III. Etatist
I. Neo-Utilitarian Democracy: Market Governance
The neo-utilitarian model of democracy (Model One) is generally associated with market
liberalism (Buchanan/Tullock 1974, Friedman 1982 [1962], Hayek 1960, Okun 1975,
Schultze 1977). Although political debates often focus on the claims of this approach
about the economic efficiency of markets as opposed to government, it is important to
recognize that at the center of market liberalism is an argument about democracy. This
neo-utilitarian view of democracy stems from a particular world view: a world of free and
equal individuals, with the capability and right to make their own choices, and hence, to
bear the consequences of those choices. These individuals do not require protection from
themselves, but rather from the arbitrary authority of the state. Human knowledge is falli-
ble. Therefore, the state cannot decide for individuals what is in their best interest. Fur-
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thermore, different individuals have different values; thus, again, the state cannot decide
for them what they should value. Only these individuals can determine what is in their
interest; hence, the best way to define the public interest is by satisfying the preferences
of these individuals, that is, the “greatest good for the greatest number,” as the classical
Utilitarians put it.
From this world view stems the neo-utilitarian model of democracy. Political proc-
esses are judged by a formal criterion: Are individuals formally free to express their pref-
erences? Democratic outcomes are similarly judged by a formal rather than a substantive
standard: Is the outcome produced by a formally competitive process? Thus, market lib-
eralism or neo-utilitarianism takes a strictly formal approach to the political process and
to public policies. It considers a democratic process to be fair if the rules of access to the
process are universal, and if the outputs are produced by procedurally fair rules.Thus, it
applies a formal or de jure standard to judge whether inputs to political processes are suf-
ficiently democratic; and it also applies a formal or a posteriori standard to judge the out-
puts to these processes. These standards can be applied to political processes – for exam-
ple referenda or voting – but, in general, market liberals argue that the market mechanism
is a superior form of neo-utilitarian decision-making. On this view, markets are more
democratic than politics.
Market-Mechanisms as Policy Tools
The standards of Model One apply not only to the policy-making process but to policy tools.
Neo-utilitarian theorists propose that even in the case of market failure, where government
intervention is justified, policy solutions should rely on market mechanisms (Okun 1975,
Schultze 1977). Examples of “market-conforming“ policy solutions are: school vouchers;
plans for trading emission rights (“cap-and-trade“); the publication of information on airline
delays. The philosophy behind these solutions is either to create markets where they do not
exist (school vouchers) or to redress the causes of market failure, such as neighborhood ef-
fects (emissions trading) or information asymmetries (airline delays).
The arguments used to defend “market-like“policy tools spring from the normative
tents of neo-utilitarian democracy: individual freedom, protection from arbitrary author-
ity, the problem of knowledge, satisfaction of preferences of the largest number of indi-
viduals. We can illustrate these arguments using the case of emissions trading. Rather
than being prohibited from producing unwanted emissions, under emissions trading plans,
producers are forced to buy certificates to cover their emissions, and may trade these cer-
tificates. Economically-speaking, such plans re-internalize externalities, thus making it
costly to pollute rather than passing on negative effects of production onto “neighbors.“
Consequently, individuals remain free to pollute, but must pay for the costs that their
pollution causes (individual freedom). Under such a system, particular industries or tech-
nologies are not arbitrarily prohibited (protection of property from arbitrary authority).
Emission-trading plans allow governments to reduce CO2 emissions without establishing
a scientific standard for tolerable emissions, as they would in typical command and con-
trol regulation (problem of knowledge). An emission-trading system allows total emis-
sions to be capped, but leaves it each individual or firm involved in this market to decide
how to reduce emissions and when to buy certificates (satisfaction of preferences of the
largest number of individuals).
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Table Two: Neo-Utilitarian Democracy
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
Unit of analysis
MODEL I:
NEO-UTILITARIAN
Individual
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS • Individual freedom, individual equity
• Protection from arbitrary authority
• Problem of knowledge
• Satisfaction of preferences of largest number of individuals
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS • Micro-efficiency produces macro-efficiency
• Cost effective
• Avoid politics, can impose risk, losses
• Incentives, so minimize bureaucracy, solve behavioural problem
POLICY TOOLS • “Creating” markets:
• Vouchers
• Internalizing externalities
• Correcting information asymmetries
CONDITIONS • Are the individuals equal?
• Can they bear the risk?
• Does the market mechanism solve the behavioral problem?
• How does the expected market outcome compare to an etatist solution?
Practical Considerations
Although neo-utilitarian theorists argue for market-like mechanisms on normative
grounds, these authors also add practical considerations that enhance the attractiveness of
market-like policy processes. First, neo-utilitarians argue that market-like processes allow
macro-efficiency or system efficiency to emerge from micro-efficient, individual transac-
tions. Thus, market-like processes should produce more efficient, and hence less expen-
sive, solutions to public policy problems without sacrificing the quality of the results.
Proponents of market-like policy solutions also argue that market processes are self-
reinforcing as they provide incentives for the implementation of the policy at hand, thus
reducing the need for political decision-making and bureaucratic monitoring and enforce-
ment. In addition, these incentives promote constant improvements in the policy-techno-
logy at hand, such that the policy standard is continuously improving. Markets provide
information, thus providing governments with feedback on the workings of a particular
policy. Finally, in contrast to politics where risk is eschewed, markets or market-like pro-
cedures allow the imposition of losses.
Again, we can illustrate these advantages with the example of emissions trading.
Rather than being locked into one standard technological solution or emissions standard,
individual firms can calibrate the exact mix of certificates and emissions reduction that is
most cost effective (micro-efficiency). Further, they may introduce new technology
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gradually, replacing machinery with emissions-saving equipment when the machinery is
due for replacement, rather than at an arbitrary point decided by law. Consequently, with
a cap-and-trade system, the same emissions standards can be met in a much more cost ef-
fective way. Politicians are not confronted with the difficult decision of prohibiting par-
ticular types of production processes or imposing a particular technology, but allow the
“market“ to drive adjustment to a new emissions standard (avoid politics, impose losses,
allow more risk). Finally, incentives are created for compliance, for reporting on com-
petitors that do not comply, and for improving performance beyond a standard set in law
(solve behavioral problem, minimize bureaucracy).
Cross-Value Criticism of the Neo-Utilitarian Model
Criticisms of markets as decision-making mechanisms aim directly at the main assump-
tions and logic of the neo-utilitarian world view. Thus, by relying on cross-paradigm
criticism, we can question the taken-for-granted assumptions of the market paradigm.
First, critics of market approaches assert that not all individuals are equal. Significant dif-
ferences in resources, access to information, and cognitive skills may affect access to
market choice-mechanisms, and thus the outcomes and fairness of these processes. Sec-
ond, there may be bias and distortion in the individual choice process, as well as in the
aggregation of these choices; framing, cueing, information cascades, various heuristics
and other cognitive effects may distort choice. (For popular summaries of these problems
see Gladwell 2005, Thaler/Sunstein 2009.) Third, although proponents of the market ap-
proach argue that market-like choice procedures allows governments to avoid politics and
bureaucracy and impose risks, the introduction of market mechanisms is rife with politics
and requires bureaucratic monitoring – in some cases more extensive monitoring than in a
command-and-control situation.
Conditions for Market-Conforming Policy Tools
From these criticisms, we may develop a policy “check-list” that identifies the conditions
under which a market-like choice mechanism is appropriate. First, even if individuals in
general may vary greatly in terms of their resources and capabilities, are the individuals
in the democratic market-at-hand equal enough that we consider a market-like procedure
to be normatively acceptable? In the case of emissions trading, we might judge firms to
be equal enough to participate in such a market governance mechanism. Second, can the
market participants bear risk? And if there are inequalities, can they be compensated?
Again, in the case of emissions trading, firms may have sufficient profit margins to re-
internalize the costs of their emissions production, and systematic differences – say coal-
burning industries versus those using nuclear power – may be amenable to compensation.
Third, does the market indeed solve the behavioral problem? Is there a match between the
incentives provided by the market solution and the intended result? In our example, are
the costs of the certificates high enough to induce emissions reduction in firms? Fourth,
how does the market result compare with a given substantive standard? That is, how does
the predicted effect of a cap-and-trade system compare with an absolute limit on emis-
sions decided on by law? Finally, the workings of such a market-like solution will reflect
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the politics and bureaucracy of creating the rules of the game for such choice mecha-
nisms. As Orlowski and Gründinger’s (this issue) case studies show, the impact of poli-
tics on the creation of national allocation plans for CO2 emissions certificates produced
very different levels of emissions savings in Germany and Britain: in Britain, CO2 certifi-
cates emissions were reduced by a much greater amount than in Germany, whose over-
allocation of certificates resulted in certificates that were virtually worthless, and hence
produced little incentive to reduce emissions. Moreover, although market proponents ar-
gue that incentive-based governance reduces the need for bureaucracy, the project of
monitoring compliance – that is, to check whether the certificates held by an individual
firm match the level of emissions is more complex than in the case of a uniform technical
standard.
Precisely this impact of political and administrative factors on the design of policy
solutions is the domain of our competing models of democratic public policy: pluralist
democracy, etatist democracy and institutionalist democracy.
II. Pluralist Democracy: Governance through Associations
The pluralist model of democracy (Model Two) begins with a set of normative concerns
that are both similar and different to that of neo-utilitarian democracy (Model One). As in
the liberal model, the freedom of individuals and freedom from arbitrary government
authority are central concerns, but, by contrast to the liberal model, individuals are
viewed as belonging to groups, and in need of the socialization that group participation
entails. As the classical pluralist author Truman states in his treatise The Governmental
Process (1971 [1951]), “man is a social animal.” Whereas the classical liberal view is of
individuals as atomistic and socially unencumbered (Sandel 1994 [1984]), in the pluralist
paradigm, values, wishes and preferences have social origins, and the “good life” has a
social component. At the same time, however, classical pluralists, such as Laski and
Fraenkel (1968), were concerned with the dangers of centralized state power and skepti-
cal of transcendent norms or values as a guide to state action. Consequently, groups are
viewed by this paradigm (originally outlined by Tocqueville in his work Democracy in
America) as a critical intermediary in bundling citizens’ preferences and influence so as
to provide education and moderation to citizens, and at the same time provide an effective
counterweight to the state.
Group bargaining is based on competition amongst interest-groups for members and
for influence on governmental decision-making. The ideal political process depends upon
the freedom of individuals to form groups, and the freedom of groups to lobby govern-
ment. From these lobby activities result patterns of public policy that are normatively ac-
ceptable, as long as the political system is open, competitive and bound by the “rules of
the game.“ In a sense, pluralist democracy is based on the ideal of a political market
coming to equilibrium with interest groups playing an important intermediary role. Thus,
the standard for judging policy outputs in Model Two is a posteriori; the outputs are
judged solely by the fairness of the process. In contrast to Model One, however, Model
Two applies a substantive standard to political inputs. Pluralist theory is far more con-
cerned with barriers to participation and influence than adherents of Model One. That is,
the standard for participation is not merely a de jure standard but a de facto standard.
Truman (1971 [1951]), for example, considers carefully the exclusion of particular
76 Ellen M. Immergut
groups – such as organized labor – from the political system, and considers systematic
exclusion as a crisis point from which the political system must recover (by opening ac-
cess) or descend into crisis. Furthermore, pluralists are concerned about the substantive
quality of the preferences expressed through the group model: the inputs to politics need
to be aggregated and moderated through group participation. Pluralist theory fears mass
politics and anomie, criticizing plebiscitary politics and urging political socialization
through groups (Kornhauser 1959, Tocqueville 1978 [1856]). Thus again, the criterion
for judging inputs is substantive and not merely formal. To summarize, the normative
considerations of importance to pluralist democratic theory are: the need to provide a
counterbalance to state power; the need for groups to aggregate and moderate the de-
mands of individuals; prevention of both mass society and totalitarian politics; equal ac-
cess of societal groups to the political process.
Table Three: Pluralist Democracy
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
Unit of analysis
MODEL II:
PLURALIST
Interest groups
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS • Groups provide counterbalance to state power
• Groups aggregate and moderate demands of individuals
• Prevention of Mass Society and Totalitarian Politics
• Equal access of groups to Political Process
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS • Provides state with information
• Increases societal cooperation and lowers the costs of implementation
• Increases responsiveness and flexibility of public policy
• Unburdens state yet increases governance capacity by devolving public re-
sponsibilities to private or quasi-private groups
POLICY TOOLS • Interest group negotiations:
• Industrial relations
• Health insurance carried by associations
• Occupational health and safety
• Negotiated environmental standards
CONDITIONS • Is there a group for every interest?
• Do the groups represent the interests of their members?
• Are the groups balanced?
• Is the negotiated outcome in the public interest?
Practical Considerations
The ideal of pluralist democracy is relevant both for the analysis of the political process
used to produce a specific policy, and for the use of governance by associations as a pol-
icy tool. Although corporatist theory is based on an empirical critique of pluralism, taken
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as a model of democracy and as a state theory, it is in fact quite similar to pluralism. Cor-
poratist theory criticizes pluralism for its lack of recognition of the costs of organization
and the deep inequalities in group representation that result from historical processes and
state intervention – including unequal state recognition of groups and even state forma-
tion of groups (Lehmbruch 2001). Corporatism also recognizes the iron law of oligarchy
and – as free competition between groups does not exist – does not assume that leaders
are completely responsive to their membership. Nevertheless, as a pragmatic strategy of
governance, corporatist theories find much to recommend in policy-making and imple-
mentation through corporatist systems of interest-intermediation. Exactly as posited by
pluralist theory, group association aggregates and moderates membership demands, thus
reducing “citizen unruliness” (Schmitter 1981). Oligarchic tendencies can be instrumen-
talized by states, as the moderation called for by the “logic of influence“ can help to
overcome issues in the “logic of membership“ during implementation (Schmitter/Streek
1985). Furthermore, as association leaders are elected by their members, there is demo-
cratic accountability within corporatist interest associations. Thus, in analogy with our
consideration of Model One, we can outline the practical considerations that speak for
use of interest negotiation as a means of democratic governance: groups may provide the
state with information; group negotiations increase social cooperation and lower the costs
of policy implementation; group input increases the responsiveness and flexibility of
public policy; group involvement unburdens the state, yet increases governance capacity
by devolving public responsibilities to private or quasi-private groups.
Governance by Associations as a Policy Tool
Many policy solutions are based on the pluralist/corporatist ideal. Labor relations legisla-
tion, for example, does not impose policy outcomes, but allows representatives of man-
agement and labor to bargain directly about wages and working conditions. In analogy to
policies that attempt to create markets or to redress market distortions, provisions con-
cerning improper management practices or procedures for mediation of labor conflicts
aim to redress problems in the balance of pluralist bargaining, but then allow the “social
partners” to negotiate directly on policies. In environmental policy, as Seifert (this issue)
shows, the development of the “Grüner Punkt” or “Duales System” in Germany is a good
example of the use of corporatist practices to draft and implement a policy solution. Rep-
resentatives of the interests involved – retail trade, packaging industry, food and beverage
industry and many others – were represented by peak associations that worked out the
details of a system to allow pick-up and recycling of packaging waste. To be sure, the
main idea behind the actual solution picked – internalizing the costs of packaging waste
by making the producers of this waste responsible for its disposal – is linked to the neo-
utilitarian model. But the political process and the ensuing governance structure for im-
plementing the policy solution illustrate many of the normative and practical advantages
that pluralist and corporatist theorists claim about the benefits of interest group negotia-
tion as a policy tool. In place of a government bureaucracy, a voluntary system was cre-
ated, thus counterbalancing government power. The groups involved aggregated and
moderated the demands of their individual members, preventing an escalation of de-
mands, but yet providing members with the ability to promote their interests. By relying
on a conciliatory political process, implementation was smooth, and not costly for the
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state. Moreover, as the “Duales System” is based on contracts between the producers of
packaged goods and waste collection firms, principal-agent problems are reduced, and the
details of waste collection schedules, recycling procedures and the like can be flexibly
changed without recourse to new law-making or administrative procedures.
At the same time, however, many criticisms may be leveled at both the political process
and the policy results. Not all potentially-relevant groups, such as environmental groups,
were involved in these negotiations, while others – e.g., consumers – were poorly organized.
Furthermore, the main ecological goals of the policy, namely to reduce and not just dispose
waste, were hardly met. Thus, corporatist politics may have a tendency towards exclusion of
the unorganized and to preserve the status quo at the cost of radical innovation, even when
they both increase the effectiveness and reduce the costs of implementation.
Cross-Value Critique of Associational Governance
These problems of the “Grüner Punkt” illustrate some general criticisms made of interest-
group negotiation as a policy tool. Neo-utilitarian theorists criticize group representation
on the grounds that groups do not necessarily represent the preferences and interests of
their members, thus distorting the representation of individual preferences, and resulting
in less democratic and less efficient policies than would emerge from a market-like
choice mechanism (Olson 1991). Moreover, the biases of group formation and interest
representation may engender structural inequalities and procedural shortcomings that mar
the policies produced by interest-group negotiation. A number of critics point to the ad-
vantages of the organized over the unorganized in group competition, such that interest-
group negotiations tend to become hived-off from public criticism and input (Habermas
1992, Lowi 1979, Offe 1969). Moreover, classical state theory asserts the need for the
state to stand above and apart from societal influence, arguing that the common good de-
pends precisely upon the separation of state and society (Böckenförde 1976, Böhret/
Jann/Kronenwett 1988, Eschenburg 1955).
Conditions for Associational Governance
These problems are the focus of the remaining, more substantively-oriented models of
democracy, Model Three (etatist) and Model Four (institutionalist). But before going on
to these models in more depth, one can state here that the criticisms may – as for neo-uti-
litarian democracy – be used to ascertain the conditions under which governance by asso-
ciation is normatively defensible and practically feasible. Even if there are flaws in plura-
list democracy, there may be some areas where this mechanism may be used effectively
and fairly as a policy tool, especially if one corrects for imbalances in associational go-
vernance (Cohen/Rogers 1995). Based on our competing models of democracy, we can
point to the following criteria: the structure of interest representation – i.e., the policy in-
puts – must cover the interests that a substantive theory would indicate as necessary (cri-
terion of substantive inputs); the interest organizations must be assessed for the responsi-
veness to their members (formal inputs) and the balance amongst groups (formal outputs).
Finally, the results of negotiation should be assessed by an independent substantive stan-
dard (substantive outputs).
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III. Etatist Democracy: Command-and-Control by States
Etatist democracy (Model Three) applies “substantive” standards for judging both the in-
puts and outputs to the policy process. The term “substantive” refers to an overarching
value or criterion that stands above and is independent of the political process is used to
evaluate the inputs and outputs to the political process. For example, a feminist standard
might be used to criticize both the ability of women to participate in politics (substantive
inputs) (Norris 1987) and the pattern of policy results that affect women (substantive out-
puts) (Hernes 1987). Similarly, the critique of both markets and politics from the per-
spective of class inequality has been applied both to political participation (substantive
inputs) and the policies that result from governmental decision-making (substantive out-
puts). Lindblom (1977), for example, argues that business has undue resources with
which to compete in pluralist bargaining, but also that political decision-makers calculate
the effects of their decisions on firm profits, and hence economic growth and employ-
ment, and thus incorporate business interests into policy outcomes themselves. Green
parties are concerned with the quality of environmental policies, and argue that environ-
mental interests must obtain better political representation (substantive inputs) and that an
objective environmental standard should be used to judge the policy outputs (substantive
outputs). In our examples of environmental policy-making, we have already pointed to
the potential for substantive critique. In the case of emissions trading, we can criticize in-
puts to the emissions market because regular citizens (the actual neighbors suffering from
emissions) are not necessarily involved, and the outputs may not be adequate in terms of
the reduction in CO2 emissions achieved. Similarly, in the case of the “Grüner Punkt”, we
could criticize the inputs to the process on substantive grounds: the lack of consideration
of ideas for reducing the production of packaging in the first place, and the underrepre-
sentation of ecological interests. The substantive criticism of the policy output would then
be based on the lack of reduction of packaging waste, although here one must note that
from a comparative point of view the German levels of recycling and use of refillables is
high by European standards.
Practical Considerations
Etatist democracy results in a practical conundrum: if the norms of social equality or en-
vironmental quality require command-and-control intervention, how can one bypass,
overcome or persuade powerful groups to cooperate? Lindblom (1977) suggests that pol-
icy-makers use incentives to “pay-off” business interests. Selznick (1984 [1949]) shows
how informal cooptation of powerful local interests was key for the successful imple-
mentation of the TVA’s electrical power program – at the same time that this “grass roots
philosophy” was responsible for organizational surrender and goal displacement in the
agricultural programs. By contrast, as Hoffmann (this issue) shows in the case of the “Do-
senpfand,” the attempt to force the introduction of the can deposit by etatist means re-
sulted in a chaotic implementation process that produced fewer ecological benefits than
the corporatist negotiations used to bring economic interests on board in the case of the
“Grüner Punkt” (Seifert, this issue).
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Table Four: Etatist Democracy
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
Unit of analysis
MODEL III:
ETATIST
Values
Social cleavages
Environment
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS • Substantive values:
• Equality
• Justice
• Sustainability
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS • Identifying powerful actors
• Strategies for circumventing status quo
• Insulation of bureaucracy
• March through institutions
POLICY TOOLS • Command-and-control:
• Compulsory education
• Minimum standard of living
• Bans on smoking
• Affirmative action quotas
CONDITIONS • Would individuals choose this solution?
• Is there market failure?
• Is there reason to abandon consultation with associations?
• Is there a clearly defined value or goal? Are there means for achieving this
substantive end? Are the costs justified?
Cross-Value Critique
Both neo-utilitarian and pluralist democracy defend a posteriori definitions of the public
interest on the grounds of value pluralism. Indeed, it is a characteristic of modernity and
of the liberal state that consensus on substantive values has been lost (Grimm 1993, Mac-
Intyre 2007 [1981]). From the perspective of theories that justify political outputs solely
on procedural grounds, the arguments made for positive state intervention must be highly
compelling. Individuals and groups with a plurality of values must find it legitimate to
intervene in a particular policy sphere. Further, command-and-control policies are high-
cost solutions to policy problems. They require an intensive research investment to estab-
lish the legislative guidelines for a given policy, and an extensive bureaucratic apparatus
to monitor implementation. Whereas market mechanisms and associational governance
generate incentives and mechanisms for implementation, etatist governance is based on
an impartial bureaucracy and application of sanctions. Thus, virtually all of the normative
and practical considerations in support of the neo-utilitarian and pluralist governance
mechanisms may be enlisted as criticism of etatist governance. These high hurdles to le-
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gitimate and efficient operation of command-and-control policies have in fact led to a
loss of political support for positive government, yet, as we have seen, substantive stan-
dards provide a needed basis of critique for the results of the policy-process.
Conditions for Command-and-Control Governance
Despite the difficulties, “substantive” policy solutions require policy makers to conduct
research as to the “best” course of policy, and to rely on costly measures to introduce and
implement the policy. In order to justify a command-and-control solution, we can begin
precisely with the “substantive outputs” standard: is there indeed clarity and agreement
about the normative goal or scientific standard to be achieved through the policy, and is
the policy technology for achieving this end both available and justifiable? Has the prob-
lem of knowledge really been solved? Second, moving on to formal inputs, would indi-
viduals unanimously agree to this policy (formal inputs)? And is there indeed reason to
suspect market failure in this area, such that a neo-utilitarian solution is not possible
(formal outputs)? Moving to substantive inputs, if all substantively relevant associations
could be consulted, would this solution meet their approval? Is there indeed a failure of
the pluralist process, such that interest-group consultation and deliberation must be by-
passed by an etatist determination of the public good (substantive outputs)? In raising
these hypothetical questions about theoretical political procedures, we move to the next
model, which aims precisely through institutional analysis to adjust decision-making pro-
cedures to produce better substantive outcomes.
IV. Institutionalist Democracy: Deliberative Governance
As I have argued elsewhere, the normative core of the institutionalist perspective can be
characterized by the combination of a search for substantively rational policy outcomes
through formal procedural inputs (Immergut 1998, 2006). This normative position –
found in classical texts from Rousseau to Habermas – results from the institutionalist
analysis of both plebiscitary and representative democracy, which focuses on how insti-
tutional arrangements distort the policy process. As the preferences expressed in politics
by both individuals and groups are affected by the institutional frameworks in which
these preferences are expressed, they cannot be taken as a pure datum of political or nor-
mative analysis. Similarly, procedures for aggregating preferences and interests may dis-
tort political outcomes. Because of institutional biases in group formation and govern-
ment recognition of groups, groups do not necessarily represent the full range of prefer-
ences and interests of citizens in a particular society. Furthermore, because the impact of
groups on governmental decision-making varies, policy outcomes do not necessarily re-
flect the balance of group opinion. Consequently, institutionalists cannot accept a poste-
riori outcomes prima facie. Thus, like the proponents of etatist democracy; institutional-
ists are concerned with the substantive results of the policy-making process. However,
unlike the etatists, they are unwilling to adopt a particular a priori definition of ‘the
good.’ That is, while a particular policy might be criticized for not doing enough to re-
dress class or gender inequality or environmental pollution, no given norm is seen as to
be so overarching as to be able to provide a general guide to policy making. Furthermore,
82 Ellen M. Immergut
in contrast to the pluralists – but like the neo-utilitarians – the institutionalist perspective
does not recognize any particular social or cultural cleavages as being “primordial” so as
to justify functionalist representation or a model of “group rights.” Consequently, the
normative solution of the institutionalists has been to search for institutional procedures
that allow expression of individual demands and values, but in such as way as to allow
agreement on the public good. As aptly described by Ingram and Schneider (2006, S.
174), this ideal consists of “open public forums in which citizens can and should be asked
to confront public policy problems that affect them directly. In such forums people are
encouraged to face policy problems not solely as clients or interest groups, but as citizens
who can incorporate the view of others in their own ‘civic discovery’ of what constitutes
the collective welfare.” (For further theoretical elaboration, see Cohen 1989, Elster 1986,
Fung 2006.)
Deliberation as Governance Mechanism and Policy Tool
As was the case for the first three models of democracy, the ideal of deliberative democ-
racy has been applied at three levels: to the democratic policy process itself; to the use of
deliberation as an ideal-type governance model; and to the analysis of deliberation as a
policy tool. Classical proponents focused on institutional reform of representative democ-
racy and administrative agencies so as to place substantive discussion of goals at the
center of policy formulation and implementation (Nonet 1969, Selznick 1984 [1949],
Weber 1958 [1918]). To this end, these authors urged a strengthening of the role of par-
liament and the rule of law, and limits on administrative discretion, interest group influ-
ence, and plebiscitary democracy. Lowi’s (1979) concept of “juridical democracy,” for
example, proposes mechanisms such as sunset legislation with expiration dates to force
parliamentary deliberation about the substantive ends of legislation, and agency proce-
dures requiring adjudication based on re-assessing administrative law at regular intervals.
Analyses of deliberation as a governance mechanism often focus more directly on dis-
course ethics and the quality communication – both amongst policy experts and policy
participants (Dryzek 2006, Hajer 1995, Holzinger/Knill 2008, Schmidt/Radaelli 2004).
Increasingly, scholarship has focused on deliberation as a policy tool, often examining
local experimentation with democratic procedures and new forms of deliberative policy
making, such as participatory budgeting (Fung/Wright 2001).
Practical Considerations
As with the etatist paradigm, it is precisely the institutionalist approach’s criticisms that
raise the vexed issue of how to correct for these distortions and inadequacies of the politi-
cal process. Thus the practical application of the institutionalist approach lags behind the
substantive criticism. Ironically, such deliberative or juridical solutions may be appealing
in precisely such areas where political discourse or political decision-making is extremely
difficult. One such area is in the area of value conflict. Whereas the standard liberal solu-
tion to value conflict is to agree to disagree and to move the controversy into the private
sphere, this is not always feasible. Surrogate motherhood, bio-politics, and cultural or
identity politics are examples of value conflicts that can neither be privatized nor are they
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easily resolved in parliamentary arenas. Court-like procedures, such as the bio-ethics
committees required in all French hospitals or the school parent-teacher-student associa-
tions found in many urban school districts, could help to devolve these highly charged is-
sues to deliberative arenas. Similarly, international courts and international rights are
looked to as a solution for problems of migrants in an age of waning national sovereignty
and increasing transnational movements.
Cross-Value Critique
As with the other paradigms, cross-value critique can help to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of proposals for deliberative democracy. The radical equality demanded of
participatory democracy is actually quite similar to that of the neo-utilitarian paradigm,
and thus subject to the same critical questions. From the perspective of concerns with
substantive inputs, one must ask, how equal are the subjects of the deliberative process?
Are they endowed with equal capacities and indeed an equal will to deliberate? From the
perspective of concern with substantive outputs, one must ask whether there is a mecha-
nism to ensure that deliberation will not become an end in itself, and whether participants
can indeed achieve agreement on the substantive goals of policy and the means that should
be used to achieve these goals. Thus, from the point of view of the etatist perspective, delib-
erative governance does not provide a guarantee that deliberation will define and further
substantive ends of democracy. Nor is it clear how political accountability will be met in
deliberative procedures. Finally, from a practical point of view, the deliberative perspective
does not make full use of the existence of organized groups and professional associations,
which could provide a basis for policy-making and implementation.
Conditions for Deliberative Governance
From these criticisms, one can lay out the conditions under which deliberative govern-
ance may provide a legitimate and effective mechanism for governance. Institutionalist
analysis suggests that the quality and efficacy of deliberative mechanisms depend upon:
the achievement of equality amongst the participants; mechanisms for representation of
the underprivileged or underrepresented; mechanisms for adjudication; and mechanisms
for ensuring that decisions are actually made. At the same time, however, one must solve
the problem of defining the community that constitutes the public sphere for the delibera-
tion, and how exactly the rules for deliberation will be set and enforced, and the results
implemented. Here, the institutionalist roots of the deliberative perspective may provide a
corrective to the emphasis on the properties and possibilities of discourse. Procedural
measures to improve the deliberative quality of parliamentary debates, associational gov-
ernance, and international negotiations may be more practical and politically responsible
than delegating public power to deliberations in diffuse and potentially unaccountable
public spheres.
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Table Five: Institutionalist Democracy
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
Unit of analysis
MODEL IV:
INSTITUTIONALIST
Institutions
Political arenas
Rules of the game
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
• Substantive critique of policy outcomes
• Eliminating inequalities in representation
• Distinction between arguing and bargaining
• Overcoming institutional and deliberative biases
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
• Value conflicts
• Transnationalism
• De-nationalization
POLICY TOOLS
• Procedures that allow for meaningful participation, deliberation, discourse:
• Participatory budgeting
• Bio-ethics committees
• Open method of coordination
• Cosmopolitan citizenship
CONDITIONS
• Can equality amongst participants be achieved?
• Are there adequate mechanisms for representation?
• Is there a mechanism in place for adjudicating claims?
• Are there procedures guaranteeing political accountability and decision-
making efficiency?
Conclusions
This essay has argued that conflicts about mechanisms of governance and policy tools are
based on different normative models of democracy. By making the empirical assumptions
and normative commitments of these models more transparent, and submitting each
model to cross-value critique, it is hoped that the pragmatic application of these models
may be furthered. In particular, institutional and political context must be considered as
relevant to the question of fit between policy problems and policy tools.
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